The 17th and 18th centuries witnessed a period of almost constant conflict in Europe and North America. In New England, the threat of invasion from the French in the North and the Spanish in the South weighed heavily on the colonists. The Crown's solution was to send an army from Britain to help govern, organise and protect the colonies, but ultimately this was not enough to secure loyalty and quell the whispers of revolt. For over a century, discontent simmered, but allegiance to the Crown and the military protection provided by Britain superseded – at least initially – the majority of grievances. Before 1763, many colonists fought for King and Country during multiple battles and the monarchy had demonstrated an ability to support and defend the colonies. Over time, however, Britain and the colonists disagreed on methods of governance and taxation, and how best to protect territory and trade. As wars waged on, allegiances became strained and imperial control required a different and perhaps more considered approach. This was not forthcoming, as Crown and Parliament continued to tighten political and economic rule, which both divided and provoked the colonists. Some, such as the political propagandist Thomas Paine, eventually argued: 'the period of debate is closed… 'TIS TIME TO PART.'

Having declared their independence, Britain's former colonies in North America would need to fight for their liberty. The response from the other side of the Atlantic was slow, but when it arrived it appeared overwhelming. Hundreds of ships and tens of thousands of troops gathered to re-establish the Crown's control. If the Revolution was not to die in its first year, the Americans would need to take on the largest expeditionary force ever sent by Great Britain up to that point… with an army of amateurs.The 1776 campaign saw a nearly uninterrupted string of British victories; at Long Island, White Plains and Fort Washington the Americans proved unable to stand against the disciplined regulars led by General William Howe, who received a knighthood for his efforts. The war appeared all but over as General George Washington led the tattered remnants of his army to safety at the end of the year, but as British thoughts turned to the next campaign, Washington showed that he was not yet finished, winning significant morale-boosting victories at Trenton and Princeton.Detailing the armies, commanders, strategies and tactics employed on both sides, The Northern Strategy, 1776 takes a fresh look at one of the most remarkable campaigns of the 18th century, one in which the British failed to secure their longed-for knockout blow and instead found themselves drawn into a long and painful war of attrition.

During the Iraq War, the U.S. Army found itself in a very similar situation to the 1st Air Mobile Cavalry Division during the Vietnam Conflict—facing an enemy who knew the terrain and was determined to fight for their cause. The difference between the two conflicts is that American forces could not take full advantage of armor superiority in Vietnam. For the infantry to truly be effective and dominant, they need to have the backing of tanks, enabling them to continue dismounted operations overwatched by tanks.The history and battle techniques of the army’s armored core have been discussed in other military conflicts in depth, but this will be the first full discussion of the role and usefulness of the tanks in Iraq, analyzing battles that were completely shaped or significantly aided due to the presence and efficiency of armor units. These units were well-trained and well-equipped and provided armored support and devastating firepower that the enemy could not easily counter. They were such a powerful force that the insurgents in Iraq had to completely change their tactics to account for the Abrams that they were facing. This work will attempt to illuminate the importance of the tanks themselves as well as the tankers who fought inside of them and show how valuable they were to the army and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003–2009.

During the first decade of the 20th century, France led the way in aircraft design and achievements. After the outbreak of World War I, France produced trailblazing designs early – the Morane Saulnier monoplanes, Nieuport fighters, and then the Spads – clearly leading the way in terms of trends in aviation. Although the Fokker Eindeckers were the first 'point and shoot' aircraft, the Nieuport 11, while lacking interrupter gear, was the first maneuverable and cleanly designed fighter that featured ailerons and responsive controls on all axes. The Nieuports were so successful that Germany co-opted the sesquiplane with their Albatros line of fighters. The Spad VII was the first Allied fighter to employ an inline engine, and by extension influenced the design path of the S.E.5a and the Dolphin.French construction methodology was eclectic – the Nieuports were straightforward in their construction, as were the British, but the Spad was a labour-intensive yet rugged and finely built aircraft – requiring many different skill sets to produce. Moreover, Spads were built under license by many companies in France as well as in Britain. Finally, French engines were in demand for not only their own aircraft, but for much of the British aviation industry as well. This fully illustrated book complements the author’s titles on the German and French fighter aircraft.

The American way of war is enabled by the concept of massing all available firepower—when done correctly it makes US forces hard to beat. However improvised explosive devices have increasingly enabled a new kind of asymmetric warfare, one that conventional forces continue to struggle to counter. This book offers a “counter-IED playbook,” one based upon the author’s experiences of over 90 months of combat operations, working the problem sets of Fires, Effects, IEDs,Close Target Reconnaissance, Tracking-Tagging-Locating (TTL), and Information Operations. This text offers insights into the ways through some of the most complicated problems that have tested the Department of Defense, and the Army—the problems of how a conventional force is organized, manned, equipped, and trained to deal with the problem of IEDs; and how the Army is doctrinally organized to deal with an emerging revolution of military affairs.

Some of the most daring naval raids undertaken during World War II involved the use of midget submarines — craft of under 150 tons and crewed by just a handful of men — including Japanese midget submarines deployed at Pearl Harbor, the British X-craft attack on the Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord protected by layers of antisubmarine defenses, an Italian Maiale attaching limpet mines to the HMS Valiant, and German craft attacking Allied shipping off landing beaches.This Casemate Illustrated Special features all classes of midget subs and human torpedoes designed and used during World War II, and explores how they were used, featuring firsthand accounts from the men who operated these tiny craft. It will also feature the recovery of various wrecks of German, British, Japanese, and Italian midget submarines, including the search for the midget submarines sunk at Pearl Harbor in 1941. The final chapter will feature the restoration, testing and successful operation of a German Biber midget submarine.The expert text will be accompanied by both period photographs and exterior and interior images of the many midget submarines preserved in museums to this day.

Visual Friendlies, Tally Target: Surges continues the story of the role of forward air controllers (JTACs) and Close Air Support (CAS), picking up in 2006 and continuing through 2013. This volume covers the evolution of Joint Fires through the colloquial "second phase" of the War on Terror—the "surges" of Iraq in 2007 and Afghanistan in 2010–2011. The narrative is supported by the individual accounts of US Air Force, Army, Marine close air support specialists, as well as UK, Canadian, Danish and German coalition forward air controllers. Vol. II recounts the evolution of air power during the rising counterinsurgencies, as well as the psychology and mental makeup of these exclusive tribes. Notable accounts include the recovery mission of EXTORTION17, the first withdrawal from Iraq, previously unreported missions against insurgent strongholds, and multiple instances where the situational awareness and decision-making of forward air controllers prevented civilian casualties and fratricide.The story carries with it a continuation of the strategic lessons learned from America’s longest war: where tactical successes and innovation failed to achieve a strategic outcome amidst ambiguous grand strategy, flawed policy and a failure to understand the new battlefields of the 21st century, as recounted by the men whose air power tribes went into the breach again and again. Volume II concludes as the "War on Terror" nominally ended in 2013, as the final phase of the post-9/11 wars transitioned to the "Train, Advise, and Assist" missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

By the end of March 1863, Major General Ulysses S. Grant was at a crossroads in his military career. His bold attempts in the late fall 1862 and winter of 1862/63 had all come up fall short of his objective: get his army on high ground north and east of Vicksburg and capture the last major obstacle on the Mississippi River. Grant had been stymied by the difficult region’s swampy bayous as well as Confederate resistance at key locations that thwarted his advances and prolonged his army’s miserable dispositions in the sickly camps of Louisiana bottomland. Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton had performed well using his interior rail lines and intelligence networks to place blocking forces or obstructions that delayed or derailed Grant’s movements.Realizing his career was on the line, Grant chose the riskiest operation he could have concocted. In a joint military operation, Grant marched two of his army corps down the roads and along the bayous of Louisiana, repairing them as they progressed, while Acting Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter led his ironclad gunboats with transports past the Confederate heavy artillery defending Vicksburg’s riverfront. It was Grant’s hope to get enough boats below the city to enable a crossing of the Mississippi River, a forced march into the state, and arriving at Vicksburg’s doorsteps from the east–west approach. In doing this, Grant would severe his main line of logistics and supply, something his subordinate officers thought was a disastrous mistake. Grant would take the risk in a zero-sum game: he would capture Vicksburg or destroy himself and his army doing so.This Casemate Illustrated examines the movements of the Union and Confederate armies from March 1863 through July 1863, the joint-operational cooperation between the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, the delayed and indecisive Confederate operations to stop the Federal initiative, and how the individual soldiers conducted the one of the greatest campaigns in American military history: to control the “The Father of Waters”—the Mississippi River.

The 14-month campaign to regain the control of Mississippi River by capturing Vicksburg, Mississippi stands as the prime example of how the Civil War would be fought and won. The Federal government’s policy of blockading the southern ports and controlling the inland waterways would only be successful with total control of the country’s largest river. Technological advances created by the war itself and used by progressive thinking Federal and Confederate commanders ensured that this vital southern supply and logistics base would be the focal point of the war on the western waters. Ulysses S. Grant, who had risen to fame as one of the North’s prominent heroes early in the war, boldly concluded that Vicksburg would be the next nut to crack in the Federal policy for control of the Mississippi River. Understanding that only a strong relationship with US Navy could ensure the success of Vicksburg’s surrender, Grant found a man as bold and daring as himself in David Dixon Porter and his Mississippi Squadron of ironclad gunboats and fleet of vessels. These two commanders and their trusted subordinates would frustrate John C. Pemberton’s attempts to defend Mississippi and eastern Louisiana for the Confederacy. A lack of experience in commanding such an important assignment, limited resources, poor staffing, and a Confederate government consumed with the war in the east ensured Pemberton’s position would be insurmountable as the Confederacy’s tenuous hold on the Mississippi River began to fall apart.

In the spring of 1945, simultaneously with the battle of the Seelow Heights, powerful Red Army spearheads participated in a three sub-offensive operations in order to clear German resistance for the Berlin operation. Between April 13 and 17, 1945, elements of the 2nd Belorussian Front replaced parts of the 1st Belorussian Front and began to prepare their offensive operations. Bitter fighting ensued, as German units desperately tried to hold their positions. Whilst these operations continued with unabated ferocity, Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front broke through the final line of the Seelow Heights and nothing but broken German formations lay between them and Berlin.On April 20, Hitler's 56th birthday, Soviet artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front began shelling Berlin in preparation for attacking the city. At the same time the 1st Belorussian Front advanced towards the east and northeast of the Reich capital, whilst the 1st Ukrainian Front smashed through the last formations of the northern wing of the German Army Group Center. What followed was the Soviet Battle for Berlin. Once the 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front completely encircled the city, over one million Russian soldiers began attacking into the suburbs towards the center. They faced some 45,000 soldiers in several severely depleted Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS divisions. These divisions were supplemented by the Berlin Police force, and the Hitlerjugend and Volkssturm, mainly manned by teenaged boys.

After taking Forts Henry and Donelson, the Union army prepared to try and take the vital rail hub of Corinth, Mississippi. To facilitate this, Major General H. Halleck planned to combine Grant’s Army of West Tennessee with Buell’s Army of the Ohio. Meanwhile the newly formed Confederate Army of the Mississippi was placed under the command of General A. S. Johnston. Johnston planned to attack Grant’s encampment before Grant and Buell could combine their commands.The Confederate army left Corinth and marched north into Tennessee. On the morning of April 6, 1862, Johnston attacked at Shiloh, taking Grant’s forces by surprise. Grant’s troops put up a tenacious defense with their backs against the Tennessee River. Unfortunately for the Confederates, Johnston was killed early that afternoon. Buell’s army arrived that night and next morning launched a counterattack along with Grant’s semi-organized survivors. The Union forces were too large to be stopped, and after a stout defensive effort Beauregard ordered a withdrawal. The first great bloodbath of the Civil War was over, resulting in up to 30,000 killed, wounded, and captured. Its ramifications would be felt for the rest of the war.Illustrated with photographs, paintings and maps, this is a full account of the first large set-piece battle of the war, the only time a large Union army was taken by surprise.

A full account of the Wilderness to the James River, including Grant's rise to high command, the condition of the armies going into the critical 1864 campaign, a deep look at the commanders on both sides, and the strategy of the campaign from both perspectives. The study is combat, strategy, and tactics from the first day of action until the last, when Grant—unable to capture Richmond, but now south and east of the capital—builds a long bridge and crosses the James River to attack Petersburg. Illustrated by photographs and excellent maps, it will conclude with a note about visiting the battlefields, the casualties, the treatment of wounded, and the burial of the dead.

Raised on a farm in Montana, Vernon Drake enlisted in the Army Air Corp in the spring of 1942. Assigned to the 493rd Bomb Squadron, 7th Bomb Group of the 10th Air Force stationed in India, he piloted B-24 bombers into Burma in a fight to prevent the Japanese from advancing north to China, then flew C-108 gas-hauling tankers across the formidable Himalayas to support the U.S. and Allied armies. This dangerous airlift saw tons of fuel and supplies flown daily over the tallest mountain range in the world, regardless of the weather.He and the other airmen—aged only eighteen to twenty-five—flew dangerous missions over unforgiving territory against a brutal enemy. To provide some personal identity in an impersonal war, aircrews often painted artwork and identifying names onto the nose of their aircraft. As a talented artist, Lt Drake would spend many off-duty hours painting aircraft at the request of their crews, becoming a significant contributor to the nose art of the 10th Air Force.Drake’s story, pieced together from his meticulous records, contrasts the hours spent creating works of art with the moments of sheer terror in combat over enemy targets and navigating through towering mountains engulfed in murderous storms while carrying thousands of gallons of highly explosive fuel.

A fully illustrated introduction to the role, and experience, of the Panzer crewman.The German Panzerwaffe ripped up the rulebooks of war that had been laid down by the grinding slaughter of the trenches of World War I. Armored vehicles, close-air support, and bold leadership based on mission command, Auftragstaktik, cut a deadly swathe through the armies of east and west Europe. The Panzers made a significant contribution to Nazi successes; they remained steadfast in defense as their conquests slipped away their grasp from the apogee at Stalingrad and El Alamein in late 1942, through the long years of retreat to final defeat. Attrition and overwhelming odds blunted the opportunities for advances, but with increasingly powerful weaponry, the Panzerwaffe stiffened the German defensive backbone right to the end.Part of the reason for these successes was undoubtedly the Panzers themselves, but it wasn’t just the weapons that led to the Panzers’ successes—it was the way they were handled. A weapon is only as good as those who use it and the Panzertruppen—from higher command down to individual crew members—proved themselves to be very good at using their weapons. Not just the men who fought in the tanks but those who maintained them and kept them in the field, recovered and rebuilt the casualties, and dealt with the over-complexity of design and the huge variety of types of tank, weapon and ammunition. Selection and training standards—so good in the early war years—may have dropped off as wartime exigencies bit deep, but from 1939 to 1945 German Panzer crew were second to none. This Casemate Illustrated provides a full introduction to the role, and experience, of the Panzer crewman.

In 2006, the shock and awe campaign of securing the major cities had ended, and the Iraq War had moved into an alien phase for the clandestine operators of Blackflag1. Their motto "swift, silent, deadly," the Marine operators of 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion were not intended for conventional warfare but they were now tasked with holding the Zaidon region of Iraq. In this deadly zone, where even Saddam would not send his most elite troops, the operators were faced with the war on a new front; fierce local tribes who proclaimed they would kill any who entered their lands, foreign insurgents or Marines alike.

A detailed account of Herbert Otto Gille’s IV SS-Panzerkorps that participated in many of the key battles fought on the Eastern Front during the last year of WWII.During World War Two, the armed or Waffen-SS branch of the Third Reich’s dreaded security service expanded from two divisions in 1940 to 38 divisions by the end of the war, eventually growing to a force of over 900,000 men until Germany’s defeat in May 1945. Not satisfied with allowing his nascent force to be commanded in combat by army headquarters of the Wehrmacht, Heinrich Himmler, chief of the SS, began to create his own SS corps and army headquarters beginning with the SS-Panzerkorps in July 1942. As the number of Waffen-SS divisions increased, so did the number of corps headquarters, with 18 corps and two armies being planned or activated by the war’s end.The histories of the first three SS corps are well known – the actions of I, II, and III (Germanic) SS-Panzerkorps and their subordinate divisions, including the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, Hitlerjugend, Hohenstaufen, Frundsberg and Nordland divisions, have been thoroughly documented and publicized. Overlooked in this pantheon is another SS corps that never fought in the west or in Berlin but one that participated in many of the key battles fought on the Eastern Front during the last year of the war – the IV SS-Panzerkorps. Activated during the initial stages of the defense of Warsaw in late July 1944, the corps, consisting of both the 3. and 5. SS-Panzer Divisions (Totenkopf and Wiking, respectively) was born in battle and spent the last ten months of the war in combat, figuring prominently in the battles of Warsaw, the attempted Relief of Budapest, Operation Spring Awakening, the defense of Vienna, and the withdrawal into Austria where it finally surrendered to U.S. forces in May 1945.Herbert Otto Gille’s IV SS-Panzerkorps was renowned for its tenacity, high morale and, above all, its lethality, whether conducting a hard-hitting counterattack or a stubborn defense in situations where its divisions were hopelessly outnumbered. Often embroiled in heated disputes with its immediate Wehrmacht higher headquarters over his seemingly cavalier conduct of operations, Gille’s corps remained to the bitter end one of the Third Reich’s most reliable and formidable field formations.